We develop an empirical model of labour supply that is consistent with on-the-job search and which is identified and estimated by combining two data sets: the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey which contains information on income and expenditure and the U.K. Labour Force Survey, which has data on hours and job search behaviour. We provide statistical evidence on the compatibility of the two samples for the purposes of estimating our model. We find that search has a direct negative effect on hours of work and we establish a strong positive effect of wages on hours.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to develop an empirical model of female labour supply which is consistent with intertemporal optimization under uncertainty in the presence of job search activity and to estimate it using two complementary household-level data sets.
The empirical models of labour supply developed in the literature, whether intertemporal (e.g. Heckman The way one specifies a labour supply model in the presence of on-the-job search depends on the way job offers are made and accepted. As an initial description one could make two hypotheses. First, offers arrive as fixed wage-hours packages (see for example Altonji and Paxson (1987) ). The individual accepts or rejects an offer and if accepted may continue to search on-the-job. In this case observed hours are not desired hours in the traditional sense. As an alternative to the above, one could assume, as we do, that offers are indexed by the wage only which is probably a good description of the operation 1. For an evaluation of static labour supply models see Mroz (1987) . 537 Given the offer, the individual can choose hours of work. Moreover preferences are intertemporally additively separable. Finally we assume perfect capital markets, that is, the individual can borrow and save at a given rate of interest any amount she wishes.
In our model search takes place by devoting time to this activity. The more time devoted the larger the probability of an offer. There is some controversy as to whether people classifying themselves as job seekers actually have a greater probability of a job offer, which is our maintained hypothesis here. In the context of unemployed job seekers Flinn and Heckman (1982) present some evidence in favour of this hypothesis. Moreover, the fact that transitions may also take place without search does not affect the specification of our empirical model. Finally we assume that search does not yield utility as an individual activity. This assumption has some empirical content and we discuss it below.
Given the above, the optimization problem for an individual at period t can be expressed by the following where Ct is consumption It is total leisure time, St is time spent searching, /3t is the personal discount rate and At,, are end of period t assets which evolve according to the standard difference equation
At+, = (I + rt)(At -Ct + wt (T T-It -St)). (2.1a)
where wt is the real wage, rt is the real rate of interest and T is time endowment. Vt+1(-) denotes intertemporal utility at the beginning of period (t + 1). Moreover, by conditioning on St in (2.1) we emphasise that different opportunities may arise as a result of search activity. For example, in this model a job seeker will face ceteris paribus a higher wage profile. The expectations operator Et is taken with respect to the distribution of future prices, interest rates, wages and possible exogenous layoffs, conditional on information available at time period t. The first useful conclusion drawn from solving (2.1) is that for workers (1, + S, < T) the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure within each period depends only on current income and the real wage rate and not on search time. 3. The argument made here extends to the more general case where we consider many goods rather than a single composite commodity, consumption. Clearly the formulation used here, where we just look at leisure as a function of consumption and the real wage, implies certain preference restrictions.
4. As a referee pointed out, in this context liquidity constraints could be related to the present value of earnings. The individual could alleviate them by searching for a better wage offer. This would not invalidate (2.2). But if current hours of work can be used to alleviate current or future liquidity constraints then (2.2) needs to be generalised. Weber (1990) presents evidence that for the period covered by our data in the U.K. earnings-related liquidity constraints are not binding in general.
where /,u is a measure of other income which reflects net dissaving at the end of period t. Hence solving (2.2) subject to (2.3) we obtain a demand equation for leisure as a function of w, and other income net of search costs i.e. j,u -w,S,. Using the total time constraint T = l, + h, + S,, h, being hours worked, we see that /,u = C, -w,h, and hence is observed in the data, if consumption and earnings are measured.
Using the total time constraint again, the hours of work equation is defined by h,= T-(S,'O) (2.4) where w, and ,u, are now defined in real terms. Thus search activity will have a direct negative effect on hours of work and, to the extent that leisure is a normal good, search time interacted with the wage rate (which can be interpreted as lost income) will have a positive effect on hours of work. Hence the labour supply function of job seekers will have a higher wage derivative and a lower intercept conditional on search time St. The implications of (2.4) are that given search time St and other income ,u,, both defined by the solution to the optimization problem (2.1), current labour supply depends only on the current wage. The fact that on-the-job search creates an additional link between periods over and above (2.1a) has been fully accounted for under the assumption that workers can adjust their hours of work at the start and during the employment spell. While (2.4) can be interpreted as a labour supply model accounting for search activity, it is consistent with other interpretations. Suppose, for example, that time spent searching for a new job was just another use of non-market time ("leisure") yielding utility. If this activity was weakly separable in the period utility function the labour supply function would take the form (2.4) (see for example, Pollak (1971) and Browning and Meghir (1991) ). This should be contrasted to the case where total time spent in non-market activities only matters in the utility function, an assumption which implicitly characterizes most labour supply models. In the general case where search activity yields utility per se and is not separable, search time St would enter (2.4) in a general way affecting possibly all income and wage effects.
If search time does not yield utility, or is weakly separable from other non-market activities it will enter the labour supply function as specified in (2.4). This combined hypothesis is testable. Job search activity will have implications on wage growth since the basic underlying hypothesis is that people searching on the job are doing so in order to improve their wage. This hypothesis is not testable on our data. Thus we can specify and estimate a labour supply model that accounts for the observed job search activity, but we cannot test the overall validity of the search model through its implications on wage growth. On the other hand, we consider it an advantage that the model is consistent with a search theory interpretation (which we maintain), while at the same time being robust to a variety of other interpretations.
The choice to search and the choice to participate
The optimization model in (2.1) can be solved in principle for search time St. The first-order condition will be a function of future expectations and, in general, no set of observable statistics will be sufficient to control for the entire information set. We have thus decided to use a reduced-form approach in estimating an equation for job search. The strategy we follow derives from Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1988) and is the following.
First we define a reduced-form participation indicator function. This is positive for all workers and non-working seekers. It is negative for all non-workers who are not seeking work. This equation reflects the decision to participate in the labour force and is a function of variables that account for preferences, for fixed costs and for search costs. Defining the probability of participation as P and an employment probability index pE, then the probability that a person is employed is ppE, unemployed but seeking work is P( 1_ pE ) and a non-participant 1 -P. We finally define a probability that an individual is searching on-the-job, pS. Again this will be a reduced-form function with no a priori restrictions on it. Its precise form, as well as the form for P will be empirically determined. Thus our model is structural as far as the labour supply equation is concerned but reduced-form with respect to the decision to participate and to search for a (new) job. Overall the specification is consistent with intertemporal optimization under uncertainty as well as with job search activity and fixed costs. Details on the identification and estimation of the model are discussed in Section 3.
DATA, EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY
The data used in this study has been drawn from two independent sources: the U.K. Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey (FES) both for 1983. The FES is a continuing survey covering the whole year and contains approximately 7000 observations, on households. The LFS takes place over one month only and covers 70,000 households. The two surveys are complementary in that they both contain detailed demographic characteristics, education, skill etc. but only the LFS contains information on on-the-job search. The LFS contains no income or consumption information. Although both surveys contain hours information we use only the hours information contained in LFS where both hours and search behaviour are jointly observed. This allows us to test for the exogeneity of search. Thus wage and "other income" information will be obtained from FES while hours and search activity information come from LFS. In this way we exploit for the first time the rich labour market data available in the LFS for the estimation of a structural labour supply model consistent with intertemporal optimization regarding participation and on-the-job search decisions, under uncertainty. The sub-sample we draw on relates to married women of working age. A brief description of the variables used from both surveys is provided in the Data Appendix. The LFS data for workers contains information on whether the individual is searching for alternative employment. We assume that individuals who say they are searching actually spend time in this activity. We do not observe the time spent searching but, given our assumption, this can be inferred (up to scale) by using the binary observations as fitted values from a discrete-choice model. The coefficient on search activity in the labour supply function will reflect the underlying variance of search time. Let S* be a latent variable denoting desired search hours and described by the equation 
Identification
An issue that requires some discussion relates to the identification of such a system of equations. First if h, w, , and S were all observable on the same sample it would be possible (although not necessarily satisfactory) to identify all the parameters using exogeneity assumptions. Moreover, given other over-identifying restrictions such exogeneity assumptions could be tested. Since (h, I, S) are observed in one sample and (w, ,u) in another, (3.2) can only be identified provided suitable exclusion restrictions are available. Thus we assume that male and female education and demand-side variables (regional vacancies and redundancies) do not enter (3.2) directly. In addition, we have made the identifying assumption that the errors in the reduced-form search equation (3.1) and in the participation equation (3.5) are uncorrelated. These restrictions are sufficient 5. In fact, the theoretical model also implies that a5 =-1, but since only the sign of St is observed a5 cannot be distinguished empirically from the standard deviation of S*". to identify (3.2) in the case when w, ,u, S and I are all endogenous for the labour supply equation. Moreover we also considered and tested the use of skill dummies as additional instruments.
Finally, economic theory suggests that both the realised wage rate w and other income , should be correlated with on-the-job search activity S as well as with all the moments of the truncated wage offer distribution. It would thus be interesting, in principle, to identify and estimate wage and income effects in a structural search-intensity equation. There are two problems with this. First it is difficult to imagine any plausible exclusion restrictions in (3.1) that would allow us to identify an income and wage effect. Demandside variables, education, and demographic characteristics are in principle determinants of search activity since they reflect search costs, preferences and expectations.
The second problem relates to the interpretation of the wage coefficient, if identified by some exclusion restriction. What economic theory suggests is that individuals with bad draws from the wage-offer distribution would be more likely to search on-the-job.
Hence a relevant explanatory variable is log w -E(log w I x). By introducing log w in the equation and instrumenting it we can only identify the effect of E(log wI x) on search activity. While this may well be a relevant explanatory variable its interpretation is by no means clear.6 Nevertheless in our empirical results we do present a search equation with a wage effect, identified by excluding the variables relating to the husband.
The model as specified splits the Labour Force Survey into four parts as shown in Figure 1 below. In the brackets we show the size of each cell. In that figure fS is the conditional density function for hours of work given the individual is a labour force participant and a job seeker, fNs the conditional density function of hours given the individual is a participant and not seeking on-the-job. P is the probability of labour force participation and ps the probability of seeking work while employed. pE is the employment probability. This probability, which relates to job arrival rates and layoff rates, is assumed independent (conditional on the observables) of pS, fNs and fS.7 The wage and unearned income information coming from the Family Expenditure Survey, together with the identifying restrictions mentioned above allow us to disentangle each of these components. Thus P is identified by "comparing" the stock of non-participants to the rest of the population. ps is identified by "comparing" the employed job seekers to the employed non-seekers. The densities of hours of work can be identified from the variation of hours within each cell. Moreover as far as these densities are concerned there are cross-cell restrictions which originate from the structure of the model and which we exploit. Finally the employment probability pE can be identified from the comparison of the employed workers to the unemployed job seekers. Since pE is peripheral to this study we do not estimate it.8
Estimation and diagnostic tests
Given equations (3.1)-(3.5) the model can be estimated over the two separate samples maximizing a combined log-likelihood criterion of the type described in Appendix B.1. Yet, given the size of our sample and the number of parameters to be estimated, it is computationally practical to use a two-stage technique, at the expense of some efficiency loss. An advantage of the two-step estimator is that the results can be more easily replicated by other researchers. Thus the marginal wage equation (3.3) and the other income equation (3.4) have been estimated using the FES for 1983. Then using LFS (1983) we use a probit between working seekers and non-seekers to estimate (3.1). Since we have assumed that E (usu,) = 0 we can estimate this equation separately from the participation equation. Next we use a probit to estimate the participation equation (3.5). In line with the discussion of Section 2 we classify all workers and all unemployed job seekers as participants (I> 0) and the rest as non-participants. This approach differs from traditional studies that classify unemployed job seekers with the non-participants. Since wages, "other income" and hours of work are not observed in the same sample and since Uhi, uWi and u,,i may be correlated we cannot identify E(U2i), but only E(uhi + a2uwi+ a3U+(i)2-Given consistent parameter estimates for b, c, ow , 8 and d the remaining parameters in (3.6) can be estimated by ordinary least squares on the sample of workers. The standard errors of these parameters must then be adjusted to take into account that we are conditioning on estimated parameters and that vi in (3.8) is heteroscedastic since it is a function of the generalised residuals (see among others Lee (1982) , Pagan (1986) ). The derivation of the standard errors is presented in Appendix B.4.
As far as the labour supply function is concerned, we replace O(S*> O)S* by the dummy variable O(S* > 0). This in effect assumes
In the variable search intensity case the conditional expectation E(S*wi I Si, xi) is required. Since neither S* nor wi are directly observable in the same survey and since no information is available in the data relating to their joint distribution, the estimation of this model would require further prior information relating to the moments of the joint distribution.
Finally, we consider a set of diagnostic tests that will help to evaluate the statistical properties of the model. First, testing whether AP and As are significant in (3.6) amounts to an exogeneity test on the participation and search decisions respectively (see also Smith and Blundell (1986)). Next we use normality tests on the reduced-form equations for participation and on-the-job search based on the third-and fourth-order generalised residuals of the probit equations (see Bera, Jarque and Lee (1984) and Gourieroux, Monfort, Renault and Trognon (1984)). Moreover we also present a test of overidentifying restrictions for the structural on-the-job search equation. To evaluate the assumed preference specification we compute a Wald statistic for non-linearity of the labour supply equation in the wage, by testing the significance of the predicted squared log-wage in the labour supply equation. Finally we experimented with several instrument sets. A complete discussion of these experiments is presented in the next section.
RESULTS
We now turn to the empirical results. We first consider the compatibility of the two data sets. A priori, there is no reason for the FES and the LFS to be incompatible since: (a) they are collected by the same government agency from the same population and (b) the definition of most of the variables in the two questionnaires is the same. In the Data Appendix we present simple descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis, for both the LFS and the FES. Moreover, since there are some differences in the mean of hours in the two surveys we present the percentiles for hours in both surveys. However, the differences in the unconditional distribution do not matter so long as the conditional distribution of hours are the same. In order to compare the lower-order moments of the conditional distribution of observed hours we have run regressions of hours (including the zeros) and hours-squared on a set of conditioning variables, observed in both surveys and for both workers and non-workers. We test for the equality of slope coefficients in the two regressions respectively. For the regression of hours we get a test statistic of 34 which is distributed as x2 with 15 degrees of freedom. For the hours-squared regression the equivalent statistic is 39 (again 15 df.). These test statistics are quite acceptable and hence we believe that for our purposes the two surveys are compatible. The only difficulty arises with the definition and construction of the skill/occupational variables. In the FES these are based on self-categorization while in the LFS these are constructed on the basis of the answers to other questions. Moreover the categories used are not identical. This implies that the skill variables may not be appropriate instruments for "linking" the two data sets. Since we have other identifying information we can test whether the skill variables are valid instruments.
We now turn to the actual results. We first estimate, using the FES, a log-wage equation on the sample of workers only and an equation for other income on the whole sample. To test for selection bias in the wage equation we included the inverse Mill's ratio identified using asset income in the FES participation equation. The t-ratio for the selection term was 1 5.'? The resulting parameters with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in Table A In Table 4 .1 education is the age at which the woman left full-time education; vacancies and redundancies are regional measures of the vacancy and redundancy rate while the dummies Dj(j = 1, .. ., 4) point to the age group of the youngest child of the household. The age groups are 0-2, 3-5, 5-10 and 11+. When Dj = 0 for all j then there are no children in the household. At most one of the Djs can be one for any household.
The results show strong age, education, demographic and wage effects. Moreover, of the demand-side variables redundancies seem to have a significant negative effect while vacancies are not very significant. The redundancy rate reflects job arrival rates. When the redundancy rate is high the returns to job search will be low. The fact that education has an independent effect over and above the wage may also reflect better job arrival rates for educated individuals. On the other hand education may be correlated with lower replacement rates (even given the wage); this would provide an incentive for educated people to seach on-the-job rather than quit. Less educated individuals may find it more productive to quit in order to search for an alternative employment. The drop of the probability of on the job search with age may also reflect lower job arrival rates but also greater attachment to their current employment for reasons not captured by the included variables . The presence of young children does not seem to have a significant effect, but women whose younger child is at school (D3>0 or D4> 0) are more likely to search on-the-job. Finally we find a strong and negative effect of the wage. Since this variable is instrumented and the wage residual is unobservable we can only capture the effects of the mean of the wage-offer distribution and not the effect of the actual position relative to the mean. Such a "surprise" term is not identified. The negative wage effect here reflects the higher opportunity cost of search time for high-wage individuals. The other income variable does not have a significant effect.
We re-estimate this search equation, excluding all skill dummies. The alternative reduced forms are presented in Appendix A, 10. The other income equation is estimated on the whole sample, except when we experiment with Skill Dummies as instruments. These are observed only for working women.
11. We would like to thank John Ham for suggesting the usefulness of the minimum-distance method when combining data sets. In Appendix B.1 and B.3 we relate the minimum distance method to our overall methodology for combining data sets.
To implement the estimator we first estimate a labour force participation equation by a probit between labour force participants (workers and unemployed job seekers) and non-participants. This reduced-form equation has been estimated using the LFS and the results are presented in the first column of Table A.1 in Appendix A.
The participation equation contains age, education, demographic characteristics as well as demand-side variables. Overall the results are very sensible. Age has a negative effect, the presence of children in any age group has a negative effect, the presence of pre-school children (Dl and D2) having the strongest effect by far. Female education has a strong positive effect (mainly a wage effect) while male education reduces the probability of participation (mainly an income effect). Finally note that the chi-square diagnostic tests presented at the bottom of Table A 
LFS variables to impute log wage and other income values for each working household in the LFS. The standard errors need to be corrected and this is done for all models (see Appendix B.4).
The labour supply results are presented in Table 4 .2. In the first column we present a neoclassical labour supply model which does not include any search variable. This model is interesting in itself since it is consistent with the presence of fixed costs of work, search costs for the unemployed and intertemporal optimization under uncertainty. Both the log wage and unearned income are instrumented.'2 An interesting result is the strong and positive wage effect. The implied labour supply elasticity at the sample means is about 0-36 with a standard error of 0-06. This elasticity is higher than any other elasticity estimated for the U.K. and more in line with those obtained in some U.S. studies. Earlier results on smaller samples and using a different methodology, have found elasticities that are much closer to zero and often negative. Yet the results are typically much less precise. We carried out a one degree of freedom test of non-linearity in the log-wage term. The t-value for log-wage squared was 1 2. The implied elasticity at sample means for this alternative model was 0-42. The remaining properties of the model are unaltered.'3
The interactions of the log-wage with Age and the child dummies are not as important but in general the presence of children tends to increase the wage elasticity except in the case of young children (note that only one of the child dummies can be equal to one for a household since these variables point to the age group of the youngest child).
Turning now to the effects of the other income measure we see that it is negative and significant. The elasticity of the sample means is about -0d13. The effect of age is not particularly significant, but the presence of pre-school children (D1 = 1 or D2 = 1) increases significantly the income coefficient. In Table 4 .3 we present some wage and other income elasticities.
The overall effect of age on labour supply is negative. Since the other income measure captures the life-cycle effects this is interpreted as a cohort effect. The presence of children less than 11 years of age has a negative effect on labour supply (for most wages and other income) while the labour supply of women whose youngest child is older than 11 years (D4 = 1) is higher at relatively high wages (everything else kept constant). Finally the selectivity term AP is positive as expected. Yet the effect is not as strong as one might anticipate. Overall the basic labour supply model that comes out of this analysis makes sense and provides particularly interesting results.
We estimated the same labour supply model using female skill dummies as instruments for the wage and other income. The wage effect is higher in this case but the main difference occurs at the other income coefficient which is now three times the size. In fact the wage elasticity at sample means is 0 5 while the other income elasticity is -037. These differences are significant. A two degree of freedom Hausman test focusing only on the other-income coefficient and the log-wage coefficient is 25 (x2). Hence skill dummies are inappropriate as instruments for labour supply. Although this could imply that skill is endogenous for labour supply, in our context this rejection is probably due to the incompatibility in the definitions of the skill variables across the two data sets.
Finally, we considered whether female education is a valid exclusion restriction. Including education in the labour supply equation reduced precision but did not have significant effects on the original parameters estimates. The t-value for the coefficient on 12. Clearly their exogeneity cannot be tested or imposed since wages and other income are not observed in the same data set as hours.
13. The test was carried out by estimating a separate log-wage squared reduced form on the FES and imputing a log-wage squared term for women in the LFS and including this as a regressor in the hours equation. education was 1P8 and hence we maintain this restriction. The above conclusions are valid for all models presented in the paper (The tests were in fact performed with search both included and excluded). We now turn to the models that include variables relating to on-the-job search. The main results that we discussed above do not change: ignoring on-the-job search does not bias the other labour supply parameters. Hence we now concentrate on the parameters of the search variables. We first consider the issue of whether search can be treated as exogenous. The test for exogeneity of search is just a test for the significance of As in the search equation. The t-ratio for this coefficient is 0O67.14 Moreover none of the coefficients of the model change significantly when we instrument search (see the last two columns of Table 4 
.2). On the basis of these results it is valid to treat search as exogenous for the purposes of estimating the hours equation.
In the second column of Table 4 .2 we have simply included a search dummy. The third column relates to the single search intensity model discussed earlier. The results from the first two indicate that job seekers do work less than non-seekers at any given wage and other income as suggested by the theoretical model. This effect is very precisely estimated for the model including just a search dummy and it amounts to about -3-2 hours a week. When we instrument search we obtain an even larger effect (-7-8 hours) but this difference is not significant. The interaction of search with the wage although negative and contrary to the theoretical predictions, is not significant.'5 We illustrate the importance for the purposes of inference of correcting standard errors in Table 4 .4.
Finally, there are other interpretations that one could give to the search variable. For example, the job seekers may be individuals who are dissatisfied with their number of hours and cannot change them in their current job. This would be consistent with a model where job offers arrive as fixed wage/hours packages. If that were the case, the appropriate empirical strategy, given our data, would be to allow all parameters of the labour supply function to be different for the two groups (seekers and non-seekers) (see Ham 1982) ).
We tried this and the test statistic that all parameters (apart from the intercept) are equal was 14 which is distributed as a x2 variable with 18 degrees of freedom. When we include the intercept in the test, the test statistic becomes 46 (19 degrees of freedom), confirming that the main differences are in the level. Given these results, a "constraints" interpretation would imply that if at all constrained the job seekers are on average underemployed. Overall the data does not reject the theory underlying our model but there is not sufficient information to discriminate definitively this model from one where 14. The term S, exp (c'x,)A' proved to be empirically irrelevant so we did not include it in the results we presented.
15. Similar results were obtained when we used skill variables as instruments. offers arrive as fixed wage/hours packages. As discussed by Altonji and Paxson (1987) it would be possible to investigate the actual structure of job offers if we had mobility data. In particular we would want to observe people changing jobs and people changing hours within the job, as well as the pre and post change wage. On the other hand we can say that the neoclassical model, adapted for the observed search activity, is not rejected by our data.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper an empirical model of labour supply that is consistent with on-the-job search has been developed and successfully identified and estimated by combining two different sources of data: The U.K. Family Expenditure Survey, which contains accurate information on income and expenditure and the larger U.K. Labour Force Survey, which concentrates on data relating to hours and job search behaviour. Moreover, since hours of work are observed in both surveys we have been able to provide formal statistical evidence on the compatibility of the two samples for the purposes of estimating a labour supply equation. The main empirical results are as follows:
(1) There is strong evidence that job search has a direct negative effect on hours. However, the positive income effect through the wage rate, predicted by the theory, is not confirmed by our results using this data. (2) Ignoring on-the-job search does not bias the wage and income effects. (3) We establish a strong positive wage effect and a negative income effect on women's hours of work. Particularly interesting is the magnitude of the labour supply elasticity which at sample means is about 04. In our model the set of defining constraints that we can write from the observed variables in a given sample is not enough to identify the parameter of interest. However a second sample including observations on additional variables is available, which then provides the complementary number of restrictions that are needed to identify the parameter of interest. On other occasions, the restrictions arising from the variables in a single sample may be enough to identify the parameter of interest, but the availability of a second sample with additional observables may add further restrictions, thus making possible more efficient inferences, and the testing of additional over-identifying restrictions.
DATA APPENDIX
Let xli and x2i be two sub-vectors of xi which may contain some elements in common. We observe N, realizations of xl and N2 realizations of x2 the two random samples being mutually independent, i.e. no sample information is available on cross-moments of variables which are not contained in both xl and x2. We are interested in estimation problems that can be represented in the form Sometimes it may be possible to write ir = rr(0) and ir2 = iT2(0) where although 6 is not identified separately from a single sample, 1T1 is identified from sample 1 and IX2 from sample 2. In such cases one can choose minimum-distance criteria of the form 9, = (*X, -irJ(6)),Aj( A , (6)) where A, is a consistent and asymptotically normal estimate of ij obtained from the j-th sub-sample. Since 0 is identified from the reduced-form coefficients ir1 and ir2, estimates of 0 that rely exclusively on *1 and I2 are consistent and asymptotically normal. Furthermore if i, and *T2 are efficient they contain all the relevant sample information about 0 so that the resulting estimates of 6 are also efficient.
Suppose that A = argmin sj (j). If the sj are efficient criteria, the minimizer of s1(7r1(6)) + s2(Qr2(0)) is asymptotically equivalent to the optimal two-step MD estimator of 0. However, for inefficient criterion functions, the two-step estimator of 6 that uses the optimal MD procedure relative to 1 and Ir2 in the second step will always be at least as efficient as the direct estimator (See Appendix B.3).
B.2. Regularity conditions for combined criterion functions
We make the following assumptions: The estimate of Q, Ql is obtained by replacing all unknown parameters by consistent estimates. In place of L we use diag (VI). An equivalent to this would be to use the exact form of heteroscedasticity implied by the inclusion of the hazard functions. However, the method we use is simpler to implement.
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